[스크랩] 중소국이 강대국과 싸울 때 - "acceptable terms"로 끝내는 것이 목표

1994년 Frank Cass 출판사에서 나온 "Seapower: Theory and Practice"에 수록된 노르웨이해군 Jacob Borrensen 준장이 쓴 글 "The Seapower of the Coastal State"에서 일부 발췌했습니다.

여기서 Coastal State의 정의는 "a small or medium-sized state situated by the ocean"으로 대양을 옆에 낀 중소국가입니다 (예를 들면 노르웨이).

1. 중소국가는 강대국을 상대로 싸울 때 '한판 승부'를 피하고 질질 끄는 장기전으로 몰아 적에게 '손해 보는 장사'라는 생각이 들게 해서 적의 '의지'를 꺾어야 하고, 이런 경우에는 질보다 양이 더 중요할 수 있다 (북베트남이 미군을 대패시키지는 못했지만 질질 끄는 소모전으로 만들어 결국 미국의 의지를 꺾은 베트남전쟁이 전형적인 사례)

 

When the purpose of war is deterrence rather than victory, the quantitative elements of the armed forces may become more important relative to the qualitative. When a state takes the initiative to go to war in order to attain a political goal, it more often than not does so on the assumption that the war will be a short one. An important goal for the small state is therefore to see to it that the war will be protracted. This may be done by building a certain endurance into its armed forces in the form of stores of weapons, ammunition and spare parts, but also by adhering to a doctrine of delaying rather than confrontational operations. Instead of spending its entire capacity in a brief intensive battle, the small state should aim at slowly depleting the enemy's motivation, morale and will by indirect actions over time. As time goes on the adversary's costs will increase. These may take the form of the loss of prestige involved in not being able to win quickly, or mounting political pressure at home and abroad to bring a messy and costly campaign to an end, or greater economical expenditure than originally envisaged. Such costs may help erode the aggressor's will to carry on and this may open up possibilities for a negotiated peace. 

2. 중소국 군대의 존재 이유 - 억지가 주목적이지만 강대국을 상대로 전쟁이 나면 이기는 것이 목표가 아니라 '용납할 수 있는 조건에서 끝내는 것'이 목표 (1939-40년, 41-44년 두 번 소련과 싸워 둘 다 졌지만 독립을 지킨 핀란드의 사례)

 

The purpose of the armed forces of a small state is not to wage war, but to avert it. There is significant difference here, even if the task of war prevention implies a credible ability to fight. The main reason for this is that the small state, almost by definition, cannot hope to achieve victory in war in the strictly military sense. Instead, the purpose of the war is to end it on acceptable terms. The example of Finland comes to mind: Finland carved herself a platform for national independence by the way she fought the Soviet Union, in the Winter War of 1939-40 and the War of Continuation (1941-44), although she eventually lost both. 

3. 중소국해군과 통상파괴전 - 지켜야만 하는 커다란 상선대를 갖고 있다면 아예 시작을 하지 않는게 좋다 (적의 가장 중요한 함정을 적의 영해 안에서 때려 잡을 수 있을 정도의 실력이 있는 잠수함이 있어야 하겠지만 이 잠수함으로 적의 상선을 잡는 것은 그다지 좋지 않다 - 적도 내가 다 지킬 수 없는 나의 상선들에게 그렇게 할 수 있기 때문)

 

The Navy should contribute to the avoidance of war through the performance of two essentially different but mutually supporting tasks: deterrence and the maintenance of the sovereignty. The first of these tasks is performed by mounting a credible anti-invasion defence and by maintaining an ability to 'bring the war to the enemy', for example by means of submarines that can operate in spite of enemy sea control and air superiority and that have the ability to threaten even the most powerful of the enemy's ships in international waters, perhaps even in the enemy's own home waters.

(중략)

In the event of a conflict, the Navy of the Coastal State must have the ability strongly to resist any type of armed attack, to reject any violation of national sovereignty, that is, be able to quickly repel, contain or put down a wide variety of violations. The objective of the operations of the Coastal Navy in war is the units of the enemy's navy, including its logistic units and its bases, but not 'innocent' merchant ships. It would be unwise for the coastal state to follow the precedent from two world wars of unlimited guerre de course, especially if it has a large merchant - of fishing fleet.

출처 : When Computers Went To Sea

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